Managing China’s rise has become the paramount US foreign policy issue. Oman Library at the Middle East Institute, http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/china-pushes-maritime-silk-road-in-south-southeast-asia/, http://www.bjreview.com.cn/world/txt/2014-06/16/content_624310.htm, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/chinas-naval-diplomacy-plan-ships-visit-german-port-of-hamburg/, http://english.cri.cn/12394/2014/12/02/191s854861.htm, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml, http://www.mei.edu/content/after-financial-crisis-dubai-china-economic-relations, What will the Middle East look like in 2030? ... “Civilian research could support a strengthened Chinese military … Furthermore, since elements of the Chinese navy were dispatched to Somali waters in 2008, China has launched joint anti-piracy exercises and naval visits to neighboring countries and regions in an effort to exercise military diplomacy. Geoeconomic strategy has remained the cornerstone of China’s diplomacy. China’s activities in the Indian Ocean have attracted a great deal of interest in recent years. The further expansion of China’s soft military presence overseas is necessary to protect its growing foreign commercial investments and other interests, not to mention the safety of Chinese expatriate workers. That report suggested China’s growing regional presence could “deter the potential disruption of its energy supplies from potential threats, including the U.S. Navy, especially in the case of a conflict with Taiwan.” Other scholars have warned that Beijing seeks to “dominate” the Indian Ocean region. Chinese military contractors have already started to sell dangerous, autonomous killer robots to customers in the Middle East. China may also seek to conduct training and exercises in the region, potentially in partnership with other militaries. Russia and Japan constitute a third tier, having deployed about 200 personnel to Syria and Djibouti, respectivel… This would also serve to expand the number of concerns for the Indian military, potentially stretching the Indian Navy. Furthermore, Chinese military vessels would be dependent on access to a limited number of bases. Usually, traditional powers are concerned more about the military balance and their relative position in the region than safeguarding their economic, trade, and energy interests, which are perceived as secondary. What PLA forces would this leave in the Indian Ocean region? Broadcast relay, optical fiber cable terminals, communications equipment, satellite navigation ground stations, and aerospace launch and ground receiving stations are also important parts of a soft military presence. This essay is part of the series “All About China”—a journey into the history and diverse culture of China through essays that shed light on the lasting imprint of China’s past encounters with the Islamic world as well as an exploration of the increasingly vibrant and complex dynamics of contemporary Sino-Middle Eastern relations. CSIS Briefs is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. By increasing the well-being of the Chinese people and developing the domestic economy, China seeks to maintain stability and reshape the world economic order. The United States, Britain, and France rely primarily on military bases to protect their geopolitical interests in the Middle East. China is following in the traditional path of other rising powers; it is expanding its military operations to match its interests abroad. China has exported 16.2 billion units of ammunition — mostly to countries in Asia, the Middle East and Africa — over the past 12 years, according to SIPRI data. [7] Thomas P.M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map (New York: Putnam, 2004). First, it gives Chinese forces practice conducting difficult operations at a great distance from the mainland. China’s military presence overseas has taken three main forms. • Argentina – A base in the province of Neuquén in Patagonia. 1763 N St. NW, Washington D.C. 20036. The Western definition of a national interest is usually anchored in concerns about threats to national security (e.g., terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the possibility of other great powers seeking political and military dominance in the Middle East). The Chinese People's Liberation Army Support Base in Djibouti is a military base operated by the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), located in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa.It is the PLAN's first overseas military base and was built at a cost of US$590 million. During the post-Cold War era, China’s overseas trade lines have never been threatened directly. In peacetime, these efforts will certainly expand Chinese regional influence. In short, Chinese operations in the Indian Ocean during peacetime are likely to resemble those of other great powers, including the United States. In the international sphere, these countries therefore focus on economic competition and so-called “soft control.” The implementation of this geoeconomic strategy relies mainly on the Chinese government’s ability to expand its overseas investment and foster energy and trade cooperation. Naval diplomacy, the combating of piracy, disaster relief, and ocean rescue have all become crucial functions of the navy. Second, counter-piracy provides a window into the operational patterns of foreign militaries. On Monday, the commander of US military forces in the Middle East, Gen. Kenneth “Frank” McKenzie, signaled that Iran's activities remain the United States' greatest concern in the region. First, semi-permanent military bases are built within the borders of other countries, and the foreign power reserves the right to conduct specific military activities in those countries. That could lead to significant shifts in the U.S. military “footprint” in the Middle East, Europe and the Asia-Pacific, although such changes have been tried before with limited success. At present, the United States has deployed approximately 50,000 personnel and established military bases in the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Turkey, Djibouti, and Afghanistan. The PLA would find it exceedingly difficult to protect its trade routes, bases, and ships if a contingency were to occur involving either India or the United States (or potentially both at once). [4] United Nations Peacekeeping, “Contributions by Country,” http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml. Middle East; China; Defense head Austin weighs warship needs in Pacific, Mideast ... for American warships around the globe as he wrestles with security threats from China in the Pacific and Iran in the Middle East. Yet, this would also prove risky, as Australian facilities at Cocos and Christmas Islands are within range of these trade routes and could potentially be used by U.S. forces in a contingency. In wartime, however, China’s Indian Ocean presence will likely create more vulnerabilities than opportunities. Mapping undersea features would be particularly beneficial in preparing for a potential wartime scenario. As China has greatly increased its foothold in the Middle East in recent years, it has become the largest trading partner for many countries, including Saudi … All rights reserved. Russia is making a concerted effort to reclaim its role as the arms supplier of choice for Arab governments. First, China will continue to use its military in the service of its geoeconomic strategy. He also said Russia seeks to expand its influence in the Middle East … Although China’s presence in the Indian Ocean may permit it to increase its regional influence, Chinese facilities and forces would be highly vulnerable in a major conflict. Military exchanges have also increased between China and Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Pakistan, the Maldives, Sudan, the Seychelles, Saudi Arabia, and others. China will strengthen economic and trade exchanges with the Middle East, complementing them with a soft military presence that is located around the relatively concentrated areas of China’s overseas interests. As a result, Chinese-bound shipping would likely have to divert from the Malacca Strait to the Sunda Strait, which would add significant time to transiting the Indian Ocean. The hard approach includes several key elements. Third, China’s soft military presence in the Middle East will continue to follow traditional Chinese diplomatic principles that reject overseas military deployments, hegemony, and power politics. China has repeatedly complained about US Navy ships getting close to islands it occupies in the South China Sea, where Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei and Taiwan all … China’s new military base in Djibouti provides a rudimentary power-projection base, which is bolstered by its access to ports in Bangladesh, Burma, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. In the years ahead, it would not be surprising to see the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) develop some rudimentary facilities in the region for conducting at least minor repairs. China’s military forays into the Indian Ocean have triggered a series of warnings. To sustain military forces in the Indian Ocean region, China needs to have reliable access to facilities in key points around the region. These types of activities would provide China with a greater ability to sustain forces in theater, thereby avoiding the costly and time-consuming practice of having to foray from distant ports in mainland China. Simply getting sufficient munitions into the region could be problematic, preventing any Chinese forces from entering engagements past the first few days or weeks of a conflict. International Status-Seeking China has … [6] By continuing to protect and develop its economic interests in the Middle East, China will increase its wealth and achieve a peaceful, gradual transfer of global power. [1] Shannon Tiezzi, “China Pushes ‘Maritime Silk Road’ in South, Southeast Asia,” The Diplomat, December 17, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/china-pushes-maritime-silk-road-in-south-southeast-asia/. ... the largest tri-service weapons expo in the Middle East. This essay is part of the series “All About China”—a journey into the history and diverse culture of China through essays that shed light on the lasting imprint of China’s past encounters with the Islamic world as well as an exploration of the increasingly vibrant and complex dynamics of contemporary Sino-Middle Eastern relations. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). They might also provide China with a limited ability to hold at risk an adversary’s surface ships and commercial vessels in the region. These forces would be less vulnerable to attack than large surface ships. The carrier also provides technical support for Chinese forces needing to dock temporarily between domestic bases and overseas stations. The Chinese economy is highly reliant on trade routes that pass through the Indian Ocean, which serves as a vital pathway, particularly for energy supplies. Third, these bases mainly support military efforts—as opposed to civilian missions—including combat, command, surveillance, and intelligence-collecting operations. With the acceleration of its military modernization, China is now able to project its power overseas. Its military influence is unparalleled. How might China use its forces in peacetime? [3] Franz-Stefan Gady, “China’s Naval Diplomacy,” The Diplomat, January 15, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/chinas-naval-diplomacy-plan-ships-visit-german-port-of-hamburg/; “China Dispatches Escort Fleet to Somali Waters,” CRI.com, December 2, 2014, http://english.cri.cn/12394/2014/12/02/191s854861.htm. The expansion of China’s soft military presence overseas is also technically feasible. Activities in the base are unknown. [6] For example, see Dania Thafer, “After the Financial Crisis: China-Dubai Economic Relations,” Middle East-Asia Project (MAP), September 15, 2013, http://www.mei.edu/content/after-financial-crisis-dubai-china-economic-relations. Beijing’s political, economic, and military influence is likely to expand in future years, triggering greater concern, particularly from Indian strategists. Such efforts are helpful for assessing shortcomings in the PLA’s ability to sustain power-projection forces far from China’s shores. One is the natural frontier of its sovereign territory; the other is an artificial frontier created by its overseas interests. Others suggest that the Chinese government is simply following its expanding trading interests and seeking to secure its supply lines against disruption. In the twenty-first century, the United States, Europe, and Japan have formed the “traditional core area,” while China, India, and Brazil have forged a “new core area.”[7] These two core regions have a higher degree of globalization and human development. Third, foreign military forces conduct both military and civilian missions, especially in the areas of humanitarian relief; search and rescue; protecting, evacuating, and escorting nationals; peacekeeping; and conflict prevention—all of which fall under the category of “soft use of hard power.” Fourth, the soft approach to overseas military activity is mission-oriented and characterized by temporary deployment, which boasts greater flexibility and a lower economic cost. It can also entail building overseas munitions warehouses, joint intelligence facilities, aerospace tracking facilities, earthquake monitoring stations, technical service and military replenishment stops, maintenance bases, and military teaching institutions. Defense Industry, Acquisition, and Innovation, Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, Energy, Climate Change, and Environmental Impacts, Family Planning, Maternal and Child Health, and Immunizations, Download PDF file of "Security Implications of China’s Military Presence in the Indian Ocean". Contact H. Andrew Schwartz Chief Communications Officer Tel: 202.775.3242, Contact Caleb Diamond Media Relations Manager and Editorial Associate Tel: 202.775.3173. Such activities could help to provide information on the typical operating practices of potential challengers, to include the Indian Navy. The security of the Middle East and its energy supplies will be defined in the next two decades by the balance of military and economic power between the U.S., China, and Russia. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. The term “string of pearls” was first used to refer to Chinese basing access in the Indian Ocean by a 2004 report for the U.S. Department of Defense. In contrast, China, India, and South Korea have not established military bases in the Middle East, though they do have convoy fleets and peacekeeping forces in the region and in the waters off Somalia. Projecting a soft military presence and establishing logistical supporting sites are currently important parts of Chinese military diplomacy. Britain and France have built military bases and deployed about 3,000 personnel in Cyprus, the UAE, and Djibouti. © 2018 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Their military presence ranks second to that of the United States. Conclusion. Although China’s presence in the Indian Ocean may permit it to increase its regional influence, Chinese facilities and forces would be highly vulnerable in a major conflict. As a result, it is unlikely that China would risk operating a carrier strike group in the Indian Ocean in a contingency. If substantial ground and air forces were based in the region, these forces would be forced to defend themselves independently if they came under attack. China claims it is for space exploration and intelligence services. Yet, historical experience shows that carrier-based airpower is highly vulnerable to land-based aircraft, which have greater range and payload. Although China is using its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to fund many of these projects, there is no question that the infrastructure is being created with dual-use purposes in mind. Leaders in Beijing have reason to be concerned about multiple potential risks in the region, ranging from maritime piracy to the potential for the United States or India to disrupt Chinese supply lines if a conflict were to occur. In the near term, China will likely continue to conduct counter-piracy operations around the Horn of Africa. Although it might be possible to convoy forces, these convoys would probably have to avoid the Malacca Strait. China’s activities in the Indian Ocean have attracted a great deal of interest in recent years. In 2013, President Xi Jinping launched the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road project—an initiative calling for China to collaborate in developing maritime infrastructure (especially ports) across the historic Silk Road trade route linking East and West. The deployment, reception, and onward movement (DROM) of foreign military powers into the global commons, mandated territory, or the territories of other countries usually proceeds according to either a “hard” or a “soft” military strategy. In a sign of the growing confidence of the Chinese military, Admiral Yin Zhuo said that the country may set … Its military influence is unparalleled. [5] Naser M. Al-Tamimi, China-Saudi Arabia Relations, 1990-2012: Marriage of Convenience or Strategic Alliance? Middle East Institute Middle East states use Russia as an alternative and a signal to the West. Without a substantial naval presence, China would be unable to protect these shipping routes. There is no doubt that Chinese engagement is changing regional security dynamics in the current peacetime environment. It seeks to resolve problems through short-term assignments. Second, the foreign nation has the right to access and use the bases freely while enjoying extraterritorial rights and privileges. He cited Chinese desires to establish military bases in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Western Pacific. This serves multiple purposes. Such an expansion is politically feasible due to Beijing’s strong record of adherence to the principles of non-alignment, respect for international boundaries, and non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs. By deploying a “soft” military presence overseas, specifically in the Middle East, China can protect its commercial interests while also providing public goods for the international community and minimizing the risk of damage to multilateral relations. The most likely Chinese strategy would be to rely on port facilities to refuel and resupply its naval vessels without having to come back to Chinese facilities in East Asia. The soft military approach can include the temporary deployment of armed forces for overseas military exercises, as well as the deployment of military patrols, peacekeeping forces, military trainers, and consultants. The rise of China has dramatically transformed the global political and economic landscape. Chinese vessels may also conduct some more specific intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions to better understand regional militaries and gather data on the geographic area in and around the Indian Ocean. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. Active personnel: 227,000. Chinese trade routes would be particularly vulnerable because the sea lines of communication from the Middle East to China run near the Indian coast for much of their journey. When examining the West’s strategic position in the Middle East, scholars should start from a geopolitical point of view. These exchanges have laid a foundation for further military cooperation in the western Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. At present, the United States has deployed approximately 50,000 personnel and established military bases in the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Turkey, Djibouti, and Afghanistan. China’s efforts to project power in the Indian Ocean are nascent, but their outlines are becoming clear. Macron calls on Biden to increase US military presence in Middle East. Trade routes connecting China with the Middle East are important to China in their own right, and the region also represents the “middle ground” connecting European and African trade with China. Although China’s sea power is facing a challenge in the western Pacific, it has not stopped China from rising peacefully. U.S. Atlantic Fleet dates back to 1906, but the name was changed to Fleet Forces Command in the mid-2000s, after the military turned its focus to missions in the Middle East. Shawa Village, located in southwest China's Yunnan Province, is an ancient village of the Nu ethnic group. An Israeli Perspective. In Dubai, the China-Middle East Investment and Trade Promotion Center covers an area of 150,000 square meters. 2017 budget: $76.7bn. Second, the Chinese convoy fleet in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters will play a “bridgehead” role in case of a natural disaster or other emergency requiring relief or evacuation. The most likely Chinese assets would be long-range surveillance aircraft in combination with submarines. Their military presence ranks second to that of the United States. The regional giant, at least in terms … It is natural, therefore, for the Chinese government to seek to protect its interests along these sea lines of communication. © 2018 Middle East Institute All Rights Reserved | Accessibility Policy | Built by Social Driver. Regardless, Chinese supply lines from the Middle East would likely be under severe threat in a major contingency and its forces in the Indian Ocean would be isolated. From Rabat to Riyadh, US allies (and adversaries) across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have witnessed rapid growth in economic, commercial, and diplomatic ties with China. Land loaned to the Chinese government during Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner’s presidency. [2] Yu Lintao, “Meeting Halfway,” Beijing Review, June 19, 2014, http://www.bjreview.com.cn/world/txt/2014-06/16/content_624310.htm. The Middle East is already China’s largest market, accounting for $10 billion in arms sales between 2013 and 2017. In recent years, under a banner of peace and development, the non-military functions of the Chinese navy have expanded. Some have warned that China might be able to sustain a carrier strike group in the region, which would certainly provide a substantial power-projection capability in a crisis. Meanwhile, China — considered by many to be the greatest competitor and threat to the U.S. — has only one official overseas base, in Djibouti, a country in eastern Africa. Washington is pushing policy changes to expand drone sales to Gulf allies in the face of Chinese competition. Russia seeks to be able to effectively influence and shape outcomes, but a lack of means limits what it can achieve. After all, Indian facilities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands are rapidly improving, which would make it difficult for Chinese forces to protect against aircraft or submarines in that area. Particularly important has been the deployment of China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, which has enabled the military to extend its reach into the South China Sea, the western Pacific, and the Indian Ocean. Yet, this would be a more severe challenge for the PLA, because China partners in the Indian Ocean region are far less capable than U.S. partners, such as Japan, in the Pacific. A secondary objective will be to prepare for the possibility of a conflict, in which the Indian Ocean might be an area of conflict, which is discussed in greater detail below.